



Relative poverty in the UK has risen massively since 1979 mainly because of increasing 
worklessness, rising earnings dispersion and benefits indexed to prices, not wages.  So 
poverty is now at a very high level.  The economic forces underlying this are the significant 
shift in demand against the unskilled which has outpaced the shift in relative supply in the 
same direction.  This has substantially weakened the low-skill labour market which has 
increased both pay dispersion and worklessness, particularly among low-skilled men.  The 
whole situation has been exacerbated by the very long tail in the skill distribution, so that 
over 20% of the working age population have very low skills indeed (close to illiterate). 
  Practical policies discussed include improving education and overall well-being for 
children in the lower part of the ability range, raising wage floors, New Deal policies, tax 
credits and benefits for the workless.  Overall, I would argue that without reducing the long 
tail in the skill distribution, there is no practical possibility of policy reducing relative poverty 
to 1979 levels. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
There is a lot of poverty in Britain and a lot gets written about it.  So why write some more?  
Because much of what is written concentrates on the trees.  Here, I am going to try and get 
some sort of picture of the wood.  Britain is exceptional in this context because it has much 
more poverty than most of the other countries of Northern Europe (see OECD, 2001, Ch.2).  
Furthermore, poverty in Britain has increased dramatically since 1979. 
  Alongside high levels of poverty, Britain also has a particularly large number of 
working-age  ‘workless households’;  quite surprising in view of the relatively high 
employment rate.
1  This is reflected in the fact that if you were not employed in 1996, the 
probability of your living in a household where no-one else worked exceeded 50%, higher 
than in any other OECD country except Finland (OECD, 1998, Ch.1).  The connection 
between poverty and worklessness is a strong one.  Over 53% of poor children live in 
workless households whereas only around 20% of children overall do so. 
  It is worth bearing in mind before we proceed, that while poverty is measured in terms 
of money, it is not just about money.  Almost anything bad you can think of, poor people 
have more of it.  More illness, more accidents, more crime, fewer opportunities for their 
children
2 and the most fantastically expensive credit.  So the purpose of this paper is to shed 
some light on where all this poverty comes from and on what might be done about it.  The 
discussion is wide-ranging and broad-brush, and much of it is based on the work of others.  
We start by providing a picture of poverty in Britain today (Section 2) and follow this with an 
analysis of the dramatic increase in poverty since 1979 (Section 3).  Then, in Section 4 of the 
paper we look at two key features of poverty.  First, the very high level of wage dispersion 
and how this increased in the 1980s and 1990s, and second the parallel rise, to very high 




                                                                 
1 When talking of poverty, I mean some relative measure – e.g. below 60% of median earnings adjusted for 
household composition in the usual way.  The relative definition of poverty does, of course, have certain 
drawbacks but not as many as the absolute definition which has to be updated from time to time (ie become 
relative) otherwise it leads to absurdity. 
 
2 Not only do poor children have much lower earnings in later life, they have much lower earnings given 
qualifications.  And this is more true for children born in 1970 than for children born in 1958 (thanks to Jo 
Blandon for this). 2 
2.  A Picture of Poverty in Britain Today 
 
Here we only consider working age poverty; that is we look at households where the head is 
of working age.  Furthermore, the poverty level typically used is 60% of the median.  Today 
in Britain, a little over 20% of people are poor and this generally happens either when no-one 
in their household works or when one person works and is not paid very much.  If two or 
more people work and at least one works full-time, poverty is unlikely in that household (less 
than 5%).  The proportion of children in poverty (around 30%) is higher than the overall 
poverty rate because children are m ore likely than adults to live in poor households.  In 
particular they are more likely to live in single parent households and are less likely to live in 
households where two adults are working. 
  In Table 1, we show how poverty is distributed across households of different types.  
In the second column we see how single parent households are far more likely to be poor than 
any other household type, but there are few enough of them to contribute only one quarter of 
total poverty.  Poverty is high in single parent households in part because more than half of 
the single parents don’t work and many of these rely on state benefits.  By and large, any 
household which has to rely solely on state benefits will be poor on standard definitions.  
Otherwise, it is worth  noting that couples without children are much less likely to be poor 
than singles without children and that households with children make up just over half of all 
households but nearly two-thirds of overall poverty. 
  In Table 2, we cut things a different w ay, focussing on employment status.  As we 
have already noted, worklessness is a key factor.  17% of individuals live in workless 
households, yet because nearly two-thirds of them are poor, they contribute more than half of 
all poverty.  Otherwise, it is clear that the more market work being done by members of the 
household, the less likely they are to be poor.  It is work noting, even at this early stage, that 
it would be mistaken to conclude that these facts point to a ‘simple’ solution to poverty, 
namely get every adult to work.  Workless adults tend, on average, to have significantly 
lower earning power than those in work so that getting them to work would have much less 
of an impact on poverty than might be imagined, unless they receive other benefits. 
  In Table 3, we focus on child poverty, and here worklessness is even more important.  
Over three-quarters of children living in workless households are poor.  And comparing with 
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Table 2, we see how children tend to be more concentrated in households where less market 
work is going on.  Of course, in part, this is because the children need looking after. 
  It is clear from all this that worklessness and low pay generate poverty.  In Table 4, 
we see the distribution of worklessness across household types.  Not surprisingly, we see that 
most individuals in workless households live in single adult households (around 70%).  Some 
of the reasons underlying this worklessness we shall discuss in Section 4.  Turning to low 
pay, we find that 72% of workers in poor households are low paid.  Of course, it is well 
known that the relationship between low pay and poverty is not strong in the sense that only 
around 14% of low paid individuals live in poor households.  This is because many low paid 
individuals (e.g. students) live in households where others earn enough to lift the household 
out of poverty (Stewart, 1999).
3  Nevertheless, there is a strong connection between low pay 
and worklessness.  For example, the probability of working for low pay in one year is nearly 
60% if the individual did not work in the previous year, whereas it is only 22% if they did.  
And looking at things the other way around, if someone is low paid in one year, the 
probability of not working 12 months later is nearly 3 times greater than if they were not low 
paid.  (Stewart, 1999, Table 2). 
  So, to summarise, just over 50% of working age poor people live in households where 
nobody works and 70% of workers in poor households are low paid.  How this has come 
about will become clearer when we look at why poverty has risen dramatically since 1979, 
which is the topic of the next section. 
 
 
3.  The Increase in Poverty Since 1979 
 
Since 1979, there has been a significant increase in poverty in Britain, much of which was 
concentrated in the 1980s.  Dickens and Ellwood (2001) report that the proportion of people 
living in working age households who are poor rose from 13% to 24.4% between 1979 and 
1999.
4  More or less the whole increase had happened by 1992. 
                                                                 
3 See Stewart (2001), Table 4, using Poverty Threshold (2), Low Pay Threshold at £4.50 per hour. 
 
4 Much of the analysis in Dickens and Ellwood (2001) uses gross income before housing costs.  As it happens, 
the results generated if net income after housing costs is used are very much the same (see Dickens and 
Ellwood, Figure 1, for example). 
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  Dickens and Ellwood (2001) present a breakdown of the change in poverty into four 
important factors.  Given that household poverty using a relative poverty measure is 
essentially associated with no pay or low (relative) pay, it is no surprise that these four factors 
are: 
 
i)  The rise in worklessness within demographic groups (+5.1 percentage points). 
 
ii)  The increase in pay dispersion (+4.6 percentage points). 
 
iii)  The compositional shift towards demographic groups with higher worklessness/lower 
pay and poverty, notably single parents (+5.4 percentage points). 
 
iv)  Changes in state benefits (-3.7 percentage points). 
 
Next we look at each of these in turn. 
 
3.1  The rise in worklessness within family types 
 
As we can see from Table 5, worklessness among working age households has risen within 
all categories, a fact which  was first noted in the seminal work of Gregg and Wadsworth 
(1996, 2001).  Interestingly this happened despite the fact that the UK employment rate was 
70.8 in 1979 and 71.7 in 1999 (OECD, 1995, Table A and OECD, 2002, Table B).  So 
average individual worklessness actually fell over the same period.  So what explains this 
apparent contradiction?  Some relevant facts are the following. 
 
i)  Overall, neither unemployment nor inactivity changed greatly from 1979 to 1999. 
 
ii)  Unemployment among low skill men (no qualifications) rose from 7.0% in 1979 to 
around 12% in 1999.  There was no significant change for low skill women. 
 
iii)  Inactivity among working age men has risen substantially (4.7% to 15.9%).  To 
compensate, inactivity among working age women has fallen from 34.6% to 26.9%. 
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What has happened is that the increase in female participation is among married women 
whose partners are typically working, while the participation of single women with children 
has fallen.  This is, in part, a composition effect arising from the increase in the proportion of 
single parent households where the head is a never-married woman who is living apart from 
her own parents, and therefore has less access to childcare.  The rise in inactivity among men 
has been concentrated on married men whose partners are not (or cease) working and among 
single men.  So among couples, we have seen a substantial rise in households where both 
partners are working (from 55 to 64% of all two adult working age households from 1979 to 
1999).  And we have also s een a substantial rise in households where neither partner is 
working (from around 4% in 1979 to around 8% in 1999).  Perhaps the most interesting 
feature of these changes is the significant rise in inactivity among men of working age, which 
we shall discuss below. 
 
3.2  The increase in wage dispersion 
 
In Figures 1 and 2 (taken from Dickens and Ellwood, 2001), we can see the overall picture 
and the key feature for our purpose is the rise in the median relative to the 10
th percentile, 
where many in poverty are located.  Looking at the actual numbers, those reported in Prasad 
(2002) are presented in Table 6.  Here we see that the 1980s was the more important period  
and that a substantial part of the shift is within occupation/industry/region groups.  These 
changes mean that the UK has a very much more dispersed pay distribution than nearly all 
Northern European countries (France is the most notable exception).  Indeed, even back in 
1979, the UK pay distribution was more dispersed;  since then, the gap has widened further 
(see OECD, 1996, Table 3.1).  We look further at these changes in Section 4. 
 
3.3  The compositional shift towards poorer demographic groups 
 
The proportion of two adult households has diminished since 1979 and, most importantly, 
there has been a dramatic rise in single parent households from around 5% in 1979 to about 
12% in 1999.  This has arisen mainly because of increasing rates of teenage pregnancy and 
divorce (or separation of cohabiting couples) in families with children.  We shall not discuss 
these interesting trends further. 
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3.4  Benefit changes 
 
For much of the period, state benefits for workless individuals were indexed to prices, so over 
a period where median real wages were rising, it should be no surprise that benefit increases 
did not greatly moderate the rise in relative poverty.  During the 1990s, however, average real 
benefits did rise quite significantly because of the operation of the housing benefit system.  
By and large, housing benefits can be thought of as indexed to rents.  In-work benefits have 
also become more generous in the later 1990s, and they are becoming still more generous, 
particularly for households with children.  We shall have more to say on this when we discuss 
policy options in Section 5. 
  To summarise, therefore, the significant rise in poverty since 1979 has been based on 
the rise in inactivity among men and single parents (mainly women), the increase dispersion 
of pay and demographic shifts biased towards poorer households.  In the next section we 
focus on the increases in pay dispersion and the rise in male inactivity. 
 
 
4.  Particular Features of the Rise and High Level of Poverty  
 
In this section we discuss two key features of the high level of poverty in the UK, first the 
increase and high level of w age dispersion and second, the rise and high level of inactivity 
among men. 
 
4.1  The increase in wage dispersion 
 
Back in 1979, wage dispersion in the UK was higher than in much of Northern Europe and, 
as we have seen, since then it has increased substantially, both absolutely and relative to most 
OECD countries (the US being a notable exception).  This increase has been analysed 
extensively, the basic idea being that the increase in demand for skilled workers relative to 
the unskilled has, in the 1980s in particular, outstripped the increase in the supply of skilled 




4.1.1  The increase in the relative demand for skills 
 
There are two basic stories plus numbers of hybrids.  The first is the trade story, analysed 
extensively  in Wood (1994).  This starts with a rise in productivity in unskilled (labour) 
intensive manufacturing in less developed countries (LDCs) combined with a reduction in 
trade barriers and a continuing increase in the supply of unskilled labour, as workers leave 
agriculture in LDCs in very large numbers.  These changes lead directly to a fall in the world 
price of traded goods which are intensive in unskilled labour (unskilled intensive goods) 
relative to the world price of skilled intensive products. 
  This leads to a fall in the demand for unskilled labour relative skilled labour in 
developed countries (DCs), and if relative wages are flexible, to a fall in the relative wage of 
unskilled labour.  Since this is all being driven by output prices in the traded goods sector, in 
the non-traded goods sector all we should observe is a ceteris paribus rise in the relative 
employment of unskilled labour as their relative pay falls. 
  The second basic hypothesis is the technology story.  This begins with the notion that 
OECD technological progress in all sectors is biased against unskilled workers and in favour 
of skilled workers.  This will lead to an increase in the relative demand for skilled workers 
across the OECD and a decline in their relative pay (given relative wage flexibility).  Note 
this shift in relative demand will occur even in the non-traded sector.  This contrasts with the 
consequences of globalisation, where the decline in the relative wage of the unskilled leads to 
a rise in their relative employment in the non-traded sector.   
  A variety of hybrid stories have subsequently emerged, mostly taking the technology 
story and trying to explain why technological progress is biased against the unskilled.  For 
Wood (1995), the bias is generated by LDC competition  in the unskilled sector, leading to 
innovation in this sector which economises on unskilled labour.  For Acemoglu (2003), the 
bias is produced by the dramatic increases in the supply of skilled labour in the 1970s, so 
technology is developed to favour this group.  Furthermore, he argues that the bias may be 
modified by labour market institutions such as trade unions.   
  Overall, the balance of the evidence is in favour of some variant of  the technology 
story (see Berman et al., 1998 and Gregory and Machin, 2000).  In particular, there has been 
a significant rise in the relative employment of skilled workers in more or less all non-traded 
sectors which is inconsistent with a pure trade story (Machin et al., 1999). 
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4.1.2  Add in changes in the relative supply of skills 
 
While the relative demand for skilled workers has been rising in the UK, so has their relative 
supply.  Then the outcome in the labour market in any period will depend on which side is 
winning the race.  In the UK (and the US), the evidence suggests that the demand side was 
winning during the 1980s and the early 1990s (see Nickell and Layard, 1999, Table 24).  In 
most of Northern Europe, this was not the case.  The consequence of the demand side 
winning is that, relative to supply, the demand for skilled workers was rising and the demand 
for unskilled workers was falling.  The consequence is a weakening labour market for the 
unskilled with relative wages falling and jobs becoming harder to find. 
  This is a very simple story and additional factors may be important, notably the 
falling minimum wage (relative to the mean) in the United States in the 1980s and the decline 
in private sector unions in the UK over the same period.  And some argue that the contrast 
between Northern Europe and the UK/US is down to the (in)famous European labour market 
institutions, which compress wages and raise unemployment among the low skilled (eg. 
Krugman, 1994).  In fact, when unemployment rose in most European countries in the 1980s, 
it rose proportionately as much o r more among the skilled as among the unskilled (see 
Nickell and Bell, 1996).  Furthermore, European unemployment has now fallen again so that 
unemployment rates in the majority of European countries are now below the rate in the 
United States.  (Unfortunately, the big four countries of continental Europe, namely, France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain are standing out against this trend.) 
 
4.1.3  The long-tail in the UK skills distribution 
 
A particular feature of the UK exacerbated the decline in the unskilled labour market, that is 
the so-called long-tail in the UK skills distribution.  Thus, the UK has a particularly large 
number of very low skill individuals.  This was apparent in the early 1960s in the days of the 
grammar school and remains apparent for the whole adult population in the mid-1990s (see 
Table 7).  Furthermore, there is no sign of any improvement in younger age groups (see Table 
8) so the size of this very low skill group appears to have remained stable despite the overall 
improvements in qualifications.  The comparison with the North European countries is very 
telling and suggests that, relative to the UK, their education systems have managed to raise a 
higher proportion of young people above a decent minimum threshold.  Indeed, as Professor 
Sir James Dewar noted in his 1902 Presidential Address to the British Association, “It is in 9 
the abundance of men of ordinary, plodding ability, thoroughly trained and methodically 
directed, that Germany has so commanding an advantage” (Quote from Prais, 1995). 
  The disadvantage of the long-tail in the UK skill distribution is that when labour 
demand shifts towards those with higher skills, the problems this generates are going to be 
seriously exacerbated if a stable group of over 20% of the population of working age has very 
low skills indeed.  The implications for their earning power are going to be profound. 
 
4.1.4  Earnings dispersion and skill dispersion today 
 
Given that today’s dispersed earnings distribution in the UK is responsible for a significant 
amount of poverty, it is worth investigating the extent to which this is directly related to the 
distribution of skills.  Some relevant cross-country data may be found in Table 9, where we 
present measures of earnings dispersion and measures of skill dispersion which are 
comparable across countries in the sense that they refer to scores on identical tests.  The 
correlation between skill dispersion and earnings dispersion exceeds 0.8 in every case 
indicating that the variation skill dispersion explains around 70% of the variation in pay 
dispersion across countries.  So what about institutional factors which are well known to 
compress the dispersion of pay, notably unions and minimum wages?  Using the measures 
presented in Table 10, we report a representative regression: 
 
(90/10 earnings ratio)i = 1.71 + 0.98 (95/5 prose literacy ratio)i – 0.13 union densityi 
(4.2)  (0.2)   
                                         -1.36 union coveragei , N=14, R
2=0.85 
(2.9)  t ratios in brackets 
 
Others are similar but if we add minimum wage measures, we find a wrong-signed (positive) 
and insignificant coefficient.  We see that union coverage has some compression effect but 
nevertheless, the bulk of the variation in earnings dispersion is generated by skill dispersion.
5  
                                                                 
5 Despite this evidence, Devroye and Freeman (2002) argue that ‘the explanation of cross-country differences in 
inequality lies not in the distribution of skills, but in the mechanism by which different pay systems produce 
dispersion among otherwise similar people in similar situations’ (p.16).  Their discussion hangs crucially on the 
fact that test scores are not good at explaining individual earnings within countries, particularly relative to 
schooling/qualification levels.  The problem here is that test scores as a measure of income generating skills at 
the individual level are subject to substantial measurement error.  By contrast, while schooling/qualifications 
may also be weak measures of ‘true’ ability, since they are used extensively by the gate-keepers of the higher 
occupations, they will automatically have a strong relationship to earnings within countries.  For cross-country 
comparisons, however, they tend to be hopeless because of lack of comparability.  Test Score measurement 10 
This provides some evidence of the crucial importance of the distribution of skills in 
explaining the distribution of earnings and hence poverty. 
  To summarise, since 1979, the increase in the relative demand for skills has outpaced 
the increase in relative supply and this has produced a progressive weakening of the labour 
market for the unskilled.  This has been exacerbated by the particularly large number of 
individuals of working age with very low skills (over 20%), a large number which did not 
decline between the 1960s and the 1990s.  Finally, we provide some evidence of the crucial 
importance of the dispersion of skills in explaining the distribution of earnings and poverty. 
 
4.2  The increase in worklessness among men 
 
In Table 11, we present a picture of labour supply which shows that the rise of worklessness 
is focussed on male inactivity, unemployment rates today being much the same as in the 
1970s.
6  This rise in inactivity is not just concentrated among older men but has occurred 
among the prime aged as well (see Table 12).   The patterns of increase are, however, 
different.  For older men, the rise in inactivity is concentrated in the 1970s and 80s, 
particularly following the early 1980s recession, but stopped in the 1990s.  By contrast, for 
the prime aged, inactivity has continued to rise up to the present, despite the relatively 
buoyant labour market in the last eight years. 
  The weakening of the low skill labour market discussed above suggests that we might 
expect relatively larger increases in inactivity among unskilled men and as we can see in 
Table 13, this is indeed the case, particularly for prime age men.  Among the older age group, 
the higher skill groups have access to good early retirement packages.  The consequence of 
these changes is that some 50 to 60% of inactive prime age men are now in the bottom skill 
quartile.  Furthermore, the relative situation of the low skilled has worsened substantially 
since the 1970s.  Indeed, using LFS definitions, since the early 1980s there has been no 
increase in prime age inactivity among those outside the bottom skill quartile whereas the 
inactivity rates of the low skilled have risen over 2 ½ times. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
error, however, will simply add a constant to the true dispersion of skills and so long as the measurement error 
variance is roughly the same in each country, any relationship between skill dispersion and earnings dispersion 
is preserved. 
 
6 Of course the higher levels of unemployment in the 1980s and early 1990s will have significantly raised 
poverty levels during this period. 
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4.2.1  Inactivity and disability 
 
Inactive men over the age of 25 report themselves as being in one of four major categories, 
namely, full-time student; looking after family;  early retired;  sick or disabled.  In the prime-
age group, around 70% of the inactive report themselves as sick or disabled.  In the older age 
group, the equivalent figure is over 50% with another 35% being early retired.  So disability 
is a key factor in understanding the rise in male inactivity.  To pursue this, we must first find 
out how many people report themselves as chronically ill.  In Table 14, we see that just under 
20% of men aged 25-64 report themselves as having a limiting long-standing illness (LLSI) 
with around 18% reporting a limiting health problem or disability (LHPD).  This difference 
appears to be systematic among the prime aged, perhaps because in the case of LLSI, the 
illness limits ‘things people normally do’ whereas in LHPD, the illness limits ‘the kind of 
work the person does’.  The former is apparently a slightly broader category, so the numbers 
with LLSI are somewhat higher than those with LHPD.  The key facts which emerge from 
Table 14 are first that the proportion reporting LLSI has not risen systematically since the late 
1970s.  By contrast, the numbers reporting LHPD rose steadily throughout.  The different 
patterns of incidence observed for LLSI and LHPD may perhaps arise because LLSI is less 
responsive to a decline in labour demand than LHPD, which directly refers to work.  Either 
way, what is absolutely clear is that the rise in self-reported illness or disability in the 1980s 
and 90s is relatively small compared to the rises in inactivity. 
  Turning to skill based variations in illness or disability, the basic result is that prime 
age men in the bottom skill quartile are around twice as likely to suffer from a limiting illness 
than the remainder.  This differential has grown systematically since the 1970s, when it was 
closer to 35%.  For older men, the differential is smaller, at around 50 to 70%, but again it 
has risen strongly since the 1970s.   
  As we have already noted, around 70% of inactive prime age men report sickness or 
disability as the reason for their inactivity.  Unsurprisingly, this is consistent with around 71 
to 75% of this same group reporting an LLSI or an LHPD.  Among older workers the 
numbers are a little lower at just over 60%, probably because there is a significant group of 
healthy early retirees among the over 55s.  Recall that some 35% of the inactive 55-64 year 
old men report early retirement as opposed to sickness or disability as the cause of their 
inactivity (in the LFS). 
  So, in the light of this, is the typical person with an LLSI or an LHPD inactive?  The 
short answer is no.  As we can see from Table 15, among prime-age men, the majority of 12 
those with a limiting illness or disability are economically active.  However, whereas in the 
1970s a mere 10% of this group were inactive, by the late 1990s this number had risen to 
around 35% (LLSI) or 43% (LHPD).  Inactivity among prime age men without an LLSI has 
also risen but among those without an LHPD, there has been no significant change since the 
early 1980s.  If we use these data plus changes in the incidence of long-standing illness in the 
working age population (Table 14) we can work out what proportion of the dramatic rise in 
inactivity among prime age men is ‘explained’ by the rise in inactivity among those with a 
limiting illness or disability.  The answer is that around 70% of the rise in prime-age male 
inactivity since the 1970s can be accounted for by rising inactivity among those with an LLSI 
and that more or less all the rise since the 1980s can be accounted for by rising inactivity 
among those with an LHPD.  Furthermore, while some of this contribution is due to rising 
rates of reported chronic illness (see Table 14), more arises from rising inactivity within this 
group.  
  Among older workers, the situation is different with around half the rise in inactivity 
since the 1970s ‘explained’ by rising inactivity among those without any reported limiting 
illness.  This expanding group would tend to report themselves in the LFS as inactive because 
of early retirement rather than because of sickness or disability.  They would consist mainly 
of occupational pensioners taking early retirement (i.e. prior to age 65), an option widely 
available, particularly in public sector occupations (eg teachers, doctors, police, civil 
servants). 
 
4.2.2  Inactivity, disability and skill differentials among prime age men 
 
As we have already noted, among prime-age men, those in the bottom skill quartile are now 
around three to four times more likely to be inactive than the remainder of the prime-age 
male population.  In Table 16, we focus on the extent to which this is related to the incidence 
of chronic illness or disability.  What we find is that two-thirds of the rise in inactivity was 
among the chronically sick or disabled and around 60% of these were in the bottom skill 
quartile.  So in 1979, low skill men who were chronically sick contributed around ¾ 
percentage point to prime age male inactivity.  By 2000, they contributed nearly 3 percentage 
points despite being less than 6% of the total population of prime-age men.  This level of 
concentration is, in fact, even higher if we use LFS data as opposed to GHS data (see Faggio 
and Nickell, 2003, for more detail). 13 
  To summarise, therefore, we find that the rise in inactivity among men is heavily 
concentrated among those with chronic illness, particularly if they are low skill.  Most of the 
inactive who are chronically sick or disabled are claiming incapacity benefit (invalidity 
benefit prior to 1995) and by 2001, over 50% of these claimants were suffering from mental 
or behavioural disorders (mostly depression) or diseases of the musculoskeletal system 
(mostly back pain).  In 1979 the equivalent proportion was below 25% (Social Security 
Statistics). 
 
4.2.3  Some explanations 
 
The fundamental economic change underlying this has been the significant weakening of the 
low skill labour market, the symptoms being a falling wage relative to the skilled and a 
shortage of unskilled jobs. One consequence of this would be a rise in the non-employment 
rate of low skill workers.  This has indeed happened, but the question arises as to why this 
rise in non-employment has been so heavily focussed on inactivity as opposed to 
unemployment?  For example, the unemployment rate among those without qualifications fell 
from 19% in the early 1980s to around 12% in the late 1990s whereas the inactivity rate 
among the same group rose by a multiple of around three. 
  To answer this question, first consider another.  Given the weakening labour market 
for the low skilled, which group would one expect to be particularly badly hit?  A plausible 
answer is that it would be the group who have an additional disadvantage, namely those who 
suffer, or potentially suffer, from a long-term illness or disability which limits the sort of 
work they can do. 
  The story would then proceed as follows.  Back in the early 1970s, even the men in 
this group with low skills did not tend to withdraw from the labour force.  Around 87% of 
men in this category were economically active at that time.  However, they did find it harder 
to get work.  Back in the 1970s, those with a long-term illness or disability were three times 
as likely to be unemployed as the remainder of the work force.  So once the low-skill labour 
market started to weaken, those unskilled men with an actual or potential chronic illness or 
disability were particularly badly hit.  Because the low skill group found it much harder to get 
work, those operating the social security system found it much easier to shift them onto 
incapacity or invalidity benefit.  Thus, for example, some individuals who were hard to place 
in work were advised by the Employment Service to claim invalidity benefit (National Audit 
Office, 1989).  Furthermore, doctors, whose certification was required for benefit entitlement, 14 
were influenced by their assessment of the probability of patients finding a job (Ritchie et al., 
1993). 
  These last might be termed ‘push’ factors, that is forces pushing men into inactivity.  
‘Pull’ factors include the fact that invalidity benefits were considerably higher than those 
available to the unemployed.  Furthermore, this gap increased from the mid-1980s to the mid-
1990s before falling back in the later 1990s.  This occurred because of the operation of the 
Additional Pension system, an earnings related supplement to invalidity benefit.  Another 
factor on the ‘pull’ side is the fact that once in the invalidity or incapacity benefit system, the 
pressure to take up work is minimal.  For example, Beatty and Fothergill (1999) report that in 
their survey of working-age men who had not worked for six months, only 5% of those 
reporting themselves as long-term sick were looking for a job.  The upshot of all this was that 
the number of male invalidity benefit claimants doubled from the early 1980s to the mid-
1990s.  This story seems to be a plausible explanation of the facts discussed previously.
7 
  In summary, therefore, we have seen in this section how the weakening of the low 
skill labour market has increased both pay dispersion and worklessness, key factors 
underlying poverty.  In the final section we now turn to matters of policy. 
 
 
5.  Poverty and Public Policy 
 
It is clear from our discussion that public policy can be used to reduce significantly and, 
indeed, eliminate poverty.  In order to reduce poverty, people in poverty must earn more, 
work more or receive higher transfers.  The simple correlations in Table 17 bear this out.  
Most of the numbers are entirely self-explanatory but it is worth noting that unemployment, 
per se, is irrelevant, worklessness being the key.  Furthermore, despite unemployment being 
irrelevant, unemployment benefits are highly significant presumably because they are a 
strong indicator of the generosity of the overall benefit system. 
  Before plunging on, it is worth noting that I do not intend to provide a detailed recipe 
for eliminating poverty because I have neither the space nor the expertise.  In much of this 
field, the devil is in the detail, so all I shall do is highlight a few significant points including 
                                                                 
7 There is, of course, a regional element to this story which we do not discuss here.  It is clear, however, that the 
harder it is to find work, the more likely are those with an actual or potential chronic illness to end up in the 
invalidity benefit system.  This fact illustrates how the discrepancy in inactivity rates between high and low 
employment regions is sustained and worsened. 
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some of the difficulties.  The discussion is organised under three heads, namely earning more, 
working more (including in-work transfers) and transfers for workless households. 
 
5.1  Earning more 
 
Under this heading, we focus on the longer-term issue of education and the shorter-term 
question of low pay. 
 
Education.  The key problem here is how to eliminate the long tail in the skill distribution.  
First, it is worth noting that the results of the recent Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA), reported in Table 18, seem to indicate that we are already well on the 
way.  Notice that contrary to the results from previous international skills tests between the 
early 1960s to the mid-1990s (some of which are reported here in Tables 7, 8, 9), the results 
in Table 18 indicate that the dispersion of literacy scores across children in the UK are on the 
low side, well below the OECD average.  There is some scepticism about this among experts 
I have consulted, not least because the results are at variance with most of the many previous 
investigations and it is very hard to pinpoint any significant reasons for such a dramatic 
change.
8 
  Leaving this aside, some facts about UK education provide a useful background.  In 
Table 19, we see that public expenditure on education in the UK has fallen substantially since 
the mid-1970s, reaching a minimum in the late 1990s.  Then, in Nickell and Quintini (2002), 
we find that the relative pay of school teachers fell significantly over the same period along 
with some evidence of a decline in quality among new entrants to the profession. 
  Against this rather gloomy background, increased expenditure on schools is necessary 
and this is happening, but the research discussed in Krueger (2003) and Hanushek (2003) 
indicates that  it is far from sufficient.  First, in order to attack the long tail problem, 
employing the best teachers and heads in the poorest schools
9 would seem sensible.  This 
would, of course, require significant financial incentives.  Second, make a serious attempt to 
ensure that curriculum and teaching policy follows the evidence.  For example, literacy and 
numeracy hours appear to have had some success in reducing dispersion in skill levels at the 
primary school stage (see Table 20).  However, the project, Improving Primary Mathematics, 
                                                                 
8 Not surprisingly, looking at the numbers, these results caused some consternation in Germany. 
 
9 That is, schools with children from the poorest households. 16 
initiated in Barking and Dagenham by researchers at the National Institute for Economic and 
Social Research, indicates that things could easily be a lot better.  The methods used, based 
on those current in Switzerland, generate substantial improvements in primary school 
mathematics attainment even in the poorest schools (see Whitburn, 2002).  Third, a lot of 
evidence suggests that heads are crucial to success and failure in schools.  The conclusions to 
be drawn from this are obvious. 
  Of course, education policy is a massive and controversial subject and my low level 
of knowledge and expertise in this area forbids me from digging a deeper hole for myself.  
But it is worth noting the list of the best ways of investing in children set out in Danziger and 
Waldfogel (2000) based on an extensive study of the evidence.  Briefly these are: 
 
i)  Support programmes to improve the health of women of childbearing age. 
 
ii)    Support early childhood interventions, targeted to the most disadvantaged children 
who are at highest risk of school failure. 
 
iii)  Support measures to raise the quality of child care and early childhood education for 
pre-school age children. 
 
iv)  Support after-school programmes and mentoring programmes for school-age children 
and adolescents. 
 
v)  Support programmes to raise levels of college attendance by high ability youth from 
low-income families. 
 
Low Pay.  While education is the key policy area for attacking poverty in the long run, what 
are we to do in the mean time?  The obvious short-run method of raising pre-tax earnings is 
to pass laws to prevent low pay.  These may be in the form of minimum wage laws or fair 
wage legislation.  And the obvious potential problem here is the danger that this will cut the 
employment of the low-skilled, thereby raising worklessness and poverty from another 
direction.  While simple economics suggests that raising wages above the equilibrium level 
will reduce employment, this is not necessarily the case.  For example, low pay 
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establishments, such as fast food o utlets, often operate with very high turnover and a 
permanent level of vacancies.  Under these circumstances, a forced increase in pay can even 
raise employment.  The following simple example explains the mechanism.  Consider an 
establishment with 50 job slots where pay and turnover are such that an average of only 45 
are filled at any one time.  If pay is forced up, workers are less likely to leave and we could 
easily have a situation where the pay rise cuts the number of job slots to 48 but 
simultaneously reduces the number of ‘permanent’ vacancies from 5 to 2, generating average 
employment of 46, an overall rise of 1.  So what is the UK evidence? 
  The introduction of the National Minimum Wage in 1999 appears to have generated 
little overall job loss according to Stewart (2001).  Looking more closely at a particular 
sector, Machin et al. (2002), in a ‘before’ and ‘after’ analysis of UK care homes, discover 
some evidence of employment and hours reductions in homes after the introduction of the 
minimum wage.   In this sector, minimum wages had a substantial impact on the wage 
structure because around a third of workers were paid below the minimum level prior to its 
introduction.  Relative to this, the employment effects were small.  Overall, the impact on 
employment seems to be minimal, not least because the spillover effects further up the pay 
distribution seem to have been negligible (see Dickens and Manning, 2002). 
  This evidence suggests that the best policy should be of the ‘suck it and see’ type.  
This is to raise the legislative wage floor slowly relative to the general level of wages until 
employment effects become noticeable.  To some extent, this is indeed the existing policy 
where from 1999 to 2004, the rise in the National Minimum Wage from £3.60 to £4.80 per 
hour represents a rise of around 5.7% per annum, slightly higher than the rate of increase of 
average earnings.  However, a somewhat faster rate of relative increase would probably be 
quite safe on the employment front and have more of an impact on low pay. 
 
5.2  Working more, including in work benefits 
 
Dickens and Ellwood (2001) calculate that if work patterns returned to the 1979 level and if 
work were made to pay enough so that no child living in a household with at least one full-
time worker w as poor, then child poverty would fall by 60%.  So the combination of 
increased work and take-home pay is potentially very effective in reducing poverty. 
  Aside from policies discussed in the previous section there are two types of policy 
which are relevant, push policies, which provide support, encouragement and pressure for the 
workless to obtain a job, and pull policies which provide benefits to top-up regular pay. 18 
5.2.1  Push policies 
 
The standard push policy used in the UK is the New Deal alongside Job Centre Plus.  The 
idea here is to provide a strategy for each individual in the target group which leads on to 
some form of training, job search assistance, subsidised employment and so on.  This job-
finding process is integrated with the benefit system  so that each individual has a single 
personal adviser who will deal with all work, benefit and related issues.  The process also 
includes the possibility of benefit sanctions for individuals who fail to participate in the 
programme or turn down suitable employment.
10   
  The workless groups in the UK for which New Deals are available include young 
people (18-24) who have been out of work for 6 months, adults (25-59) who have been out of 
work for 18 months, over 50s who have been on any benefit for 6 months, the disabled and 
single parents.  The first two are compulsory and members of these groups must enter the 
relevant programme.  The New Deal for young people started in January 1998 and 
evaluations published so far indicate that it has generated 20,000 extra jobs each year and has 
significantly reduced unemployment rates among young persons (see Van Reenen, 2000, for 
example).  Furthermore, there is no evidence as yet of a significant adverse impact on the 
labour market prospects of groups outside the programme.  Finally, Van Reenen calculates 
the social benefits to be in excess of the social costs.  Overall, the New Deal for young people 
bodes well for other New Deal programmes.  However, the difficulties involved in getting 
young people with weak skills into employment are relatively minor relative to the problems 
facing, for example, those with disabilities and their caseworkers and advisers. 
 
5.2.2  Pull policies 
 
The standard policy of the pull type is the tax credit.  This is essentially an in-work benefit or 
pay top-up which depends on family circumstances.  Such a policy will have a two-fold 
impact.  It will raise both employment and take-home pay for the target group.  For any given 
policy, the bigger the employment effect, the smaller the take-home pay effect and the size of 
the former will depend on the extent to which pre-tax pay falls in response to the increase in 
labour supply.  By and large, if tax credits are focussed on individuals whose pay is at or near 
                                                                 
10 Evidence from Denmark and the Netherlands, which have used policies of this type, suggest that they can be 
highly effective.  See Nickell (2002) and the references therein for details. 19 
the wage floor (minimum wage or minimum union rate), the employment effect will be small 
and the take-home pay effect correspondingly large. 
  In the UK, the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) was fully phased in from April 
2000, replacing Family Credit (FC), a benefit paid to low earners with dependent children.  
The WFTC was substantially more generous than FC, increasing both credits for younger 
children and the threshold as well as reducing the withdrawal rate.  Furthermore, it included a 
new childcare credit.  While the overall employment effects appear to have been small, when 
combined with the tight labour market, it has helped raise the employment rate among lone 
parents which is now over 50%, up from 38% in 1993 (see Gregg and Harkness, 2003, for 
details).  However, the major gain from WFTC and its successor tax credits has been their 
contribution to reducing child poverty without negative labour supply effects.  From 1996/7 
to 2000/1, child poverty fell by around 3.5 percentage points and the WFTC has made a 
significant contribution to this reduction (see Brewer et al., 2003, for details). 
 
5.2.3  Fundamental problems with push and pull policies 
 
The basic issue with policies to push workless individuals into employment is the extent of 
compulsion.  Currently, entry into a New Deal programme is not mandatory in return for 
receipt of benefits for older workers, the disabled and lone parents.  This is related to the 
fundamental question of who in society is expected to work and who is allowed to receive 
benefits without looking for a job.  Not surprisingly, this topic arouses great passions.  My 
instinct is more towards the work side of things and a great deal more could be done to 
smooth the path of older, lone parent and disabled benefit recipients into satisfactory 
employment. 
  The basic issue with in-work benefits is the expense of a fully comprehensive system 
which will lift all workers out of poverty in a society with a very long tail to the skill 
distribution.  My guess is that cutting the long tail significantly is a necessary condition for 
the introduction of such a generous system in the UK. 
 
5.3  Benefits for no-work families 
 
To eliminate poverty among those without alternative sources of non-labour income, benefits 
have to be raised to the poverty line and then indexed to median wages.  Even then, those 
who, for one reason or another, are not getting the benefits will typically remain in poverty, at 20 
least temporarily.  Some elements of this policy are being introduced, for example, part of the 
new Child Tax Credit is set to be indexed to earnings, as is the Minimum Income Guarantee 
for pensioners.  Also, there have been substantial increases in the child elements of the 
benefit system.  Overall, however, to have benefits at the level to eliminate poverty would be 
enormously expensive.  Those countries in Northern Europe with very low levels of poverty 
(eg. Denmark, Sweden) collect at least 10 percentage points of GDP more in taxes than we do 
in the UK and they have the advantages of much shorter tails to their skill distribution and 
higher overall employment rates.  While it is feasible to move further in that direction, it 




Summary and Conclusions 
 
Relative poverty in the UK has risen massively since 1979 mainly because of increasing 
worklessness, rising earnings dispersion and benefits indexed to prices, not wages.  So 
poverty is now at a very high level.  The economic forces underlying this are the significant 
shift in demand against the unskilled which has outpaced the shift in relative supply in the 
same direction.  This has substantially weakened the low-skill labour market which has 
increased both pay dispersion and worklessness, particularly among low-skilled men.  The 
whole situation has been exacerbated by the very long tail in the skill distribution, so that 
over 20% of the working age population have very low skills indeed (close to illiterate). 
  Practical policies discussed include improving education and overall well-being  for 
children in the lower part of the ability range, raising wage floors, New Deal policies, tax 
credits and benefits for the workless.  Overall, I would argue that without reducing the long 
tail in the skill distribution, there is no practical possibility of policy reducing relative poverty 
to 1979 levels. 
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Table 1 
Individual Poverty in Different Family Types, 2000/1 (1997 in brackets) 
 
  % of individuals 
in each type 
% of each type in 
poverty 
% contribution to 
overall poverty 




42.4 (44.0)  20.9 (23.0)  40.0 (41.3) 
Couple without 
children 










22.0 (19.9)  21.7 (24.3)  21.4 (20.5) 
 
Total 
100  22.2 (23.6)  100 
 
Source:  Piachaud and Sutherland (2002), Tables 1, 3. 22 
Table 2 
Individual Poverty in Households with Different  
Employment Circumstances 2000/1 (1997 in brackets) 
 
  % individuals in 
each type 
% of each type in 
poverty 
% contribution to 
overall poverty 
       
Workless 
 
17.0 (19.5)  64.4 (68.4)  51.4 (56.7) 
One or more PT 
 
10.0 (9.0)  29.4 (31.9)  13.8 (12.2) 
Head self-employed 
 
10.9 (12.2)  24.6 (21.9)  11.6 (11.4) 
Couple, one FT  14.5 (14.8)  19.7 (20.5)  13.4 (12.9) 
 
Couple one FT,  
one PT 
 
17.5 (17.1)  5.1 (4.4)  4.2 (3.2) 
Single/Couple, all in 
FT work 
 
30.1 (27.4)  4.0 (3.1)  5.6 (3.6) 
Total  100  21.3 (23.5)  100 
 
Source:  Piachaud and Sutherland (2002), Table 4. 
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Table 3 
Child Poverty in Households with Different Employment Circumstances, 2000/1 
(1997 in brackets) 
 
  % children in each 
type 
% children in 
poverty 
% contribution to 
overall child 
poverty 
       
Workless  20.7 (24.6)  77.4 (80.1)  52.8 (58.3) 
One or more PT 
 




11.6 (13.0)  30.8 (28.1)  11.8 (10.8) 
Couple, one FT 
 
17.6 (18.3)  25.2 (27.1)  14.6 (14.7) 
Couple one FT, 
one PT 
 
23.5 (22.0)  6.2 (5.5)  4.8 (3.6) 
Single/couple, all 
in FT work 
16.8 (14.3)  4.5 (3.3)  2.5 (1.4) 
 
Total 
100  30.3  100 
 
Source:  Piachaud and Sutherland (2002), Table 5. 24 
Table 4 
Workless Households in 1999 
 
  Per cent workless  Per cent of individuals in 
workless households 
     
Couple with children 
 
7.3  18.1 
Couple without children  8.5  12.7 
 
Single with children 
 
56  32.9 
Single without children  29  36.3 
 
 
Source:  Dickens and Ellwood (2001). 
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Table 5 
Per cent Workless 
 
  1979  1999 
     
Couple with children 
 
4.5  7.3 
Couple without children 
 
3.4  8.5 
Single with children 
 
35  56 
Single without children  18  29 
 




50-10 Percentile Differentials 
 
  All  Men  Women 
  Actual  Residual  Actual  Residual  Actual  Residual 
             
1980 
 
0.48  0.38  0.43  0.40  0.33  0.33 
1990  0.54  0.42  0.52  0.45  0.44  0.39 
 
1998  0.57  0.46  0.58  0.49  0.50  0.42 
 
 
Source:  Prasad (2002), Tables 2, 3.  These are based on log hourly (real) wages from the UK 
New Earnings Survey and are centred 3-year moving averages.  Residual inequality is based 
on the residuals from regressions controlling for industry, occupation, region and FT work 
(and gender in the ‘All’ category). 27 
Table 7 
International Test Scores 
a)  Distribution of Scores in International Maths Test of 
13 year-old Pupils 1963-64 (%) 
 
Score (out of 70)  US  Germany  England 
<5  22  8  24 
6-30  62  59  49 
31-51  14  30  22 
>51  1  3  5 
Mean  16  25  19 
cv (sd/mean)  82  53  88 
 
b)  Adult Population at the Lowest Levels of Literacy 
in the mid-1990s (%) 
 
  US  Germany  UK  Netherlands  Sweden 
Prose literacy           
Level 1  20.7  14.4  21.8  10.5  7.5 
Level 1+2  46.6  48.6  52.1  40.6  27.8 
           
Quantitative 
literacy 
         
Level 1  21.0  6.7  23.2  10.3  6.6 
Level 1+2  46.3  33.3  51.0  35.8  25.2 
           
 
Sources:  a) Prais (1995), Table 4.1; b) OECD (1997). 
 
Note:  Level 1 is the lowest level (out of 5).  It is very close to functional illiteracy.  These are 
based on tests administered as part of the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) in many 
OECD countries in the mid-1990s.  The tests were the same in every country. 
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Table 8 
Is Literacy Getting Better in the Adult Population? 
 
  Prose Literacy  Quantitative Literacy 
  % in Level 1    % in Level 1   
Age  16-25  26-35  36-45  16-25  26-35  36-45 
US  23  20  19  26  20  18 
Germany  9  12  14  4  5  6 
UK  17  18  17  22  20  19 
Netherlands  8  6  9  8  7  10 
Sweden  4  5  7  5  4  7 
 
Source:  OECD (1997).  See also note to Table 7. 29 
Table 9 
Skills and Earnings Distributions 
 
  Earnings  Skills (Literacy Test Score Ratios)
c 
  90/10
a ratio  Gini
b coefficient  90/10   95/5 
      Prose  Prose  Quantitative 
UK  3.35  32.4  1.75  2.34  2.56 
Australia  2.90  30.5  1.69  2.47  2.41 
Belgium  2.25  27.2  1.68  2.20  2.33 
Canada  4.19  28.5  1.78  2.51  2.42 
Denmark  2.17  21.7  1.39  1.57  1.67 
Finland  2.38  22.8  1.54  1.82  1.81 
Germany  2.32  28.2  1.51  1.75  1.68 
Ireland  (3.35)  32.4  1.71  2.21  2.47 
Netherlands  2.59  25.5  1.48  1.72  1.79 
Norway  1.98  25.6  1.44  1.68  1.76 
NZ  3.04  -  -  2.20  2.34 
Portugal  4.05  -  -  3.48  3.17 
Sweden  2.13  23.0  1.51  1.78  1.81 
Switzerland  2.69  26.9  1.72  2.25  2.45 








                                                       0.85   0.82     0.83  0.81    0.81  0.83 
 
Sources:  a) OECD (1996), Table 3.1, 1994 or 1995 except Denmark, 1990; Norway, 1991. 
      b), c) OECD (2000), Tables 2.1, 4.13.  Refers to 1994-8. 30 
Table 10 
Some Institution Variables 
 
  Union Density  Union Coverage  Minimum/Ave. Wage 
UK  35  40  (0.40) 
Australia  35  80  - 
Belgium  52  90  0.60 
Canada  36  36  0.35 
Denmark  76  69  0.54 
Finland  80  95  0.52 
Germany  27  92  0.55 
Ireland  43  (48)  (0.55) 
Netherlands  24  85  0.55 
Norway  55  70  0.64 
NZ  21  31  0.46 
Portugal  25  71  0.45 
Sweden  87  89  0.52 
Switzerland  23  53  0 
US  14  17  0.39 
 
Sources:  Union Density (1996-8), Union Coverage (1994), Nickell (2002), Tables 12, 13. 
      Minimum/Av. wage (1991-94), Nickell and Layard (1999), Table 9. 
 
Note:  Bracketed numbers are less reliable.  In the minimum wage case, the numbers 
corresponding to the UK and Ireland refer only to certain select industries covering a small 
minority of workers. 31 
Table 11 
Inactivity and Unemployment Rates (%), 1972-2002 
 
  Inactivity Rate (%)  Unemployment Rate (%) 
  Men (25-64)  Women (25-59)  Men (25-64) 
  GHS  LFS  LFS 
(ILO) 
GHS  LFS  LFS 
(ILO) 
GHS  LFS  LFS 
(ILO) 
 
1972-76  3.9  2.8    40.2  39.4    3.6  4.7   
1977-78  4.8  4.7    36.7  37.4    3.9  4.4   
1979-81  6.2  5.8    35.6  37.7    6.1  5.9   
1982-86  8.9  10.5    35.5  35.2    9.7  9.1   
1987-91  9.9  11.3    29.6  30.2    7.5  7.5   
1992-96  12.2  11.4  12.5  28.0  26.5  28.1  10.1  9.7  9.0 
1997-99  14.3  12.8  13.8  25.9  25.2  26.8  5.3  6.0  5.4 
2000-01  14.8  13.2  14.1  24.7  24.2  25.1  3.8  4.8  4.2 
2002    13.3  14.3    23.8  24.7    4.9  4.3 
 
Notes: 
(i)  GHS is the General Household Survey, LFS is the Labour Force Survey. 
(ii)  Data are available as follows:  GHS, 72-96, 98, 2000.  LHS, 75, 77, 79, 81, 83-2002.  
LFS (ILO), 92-2002. 
(iii)  The inactive are those who are not working and not unemployed.  LF unemployed are 
those without a job who are (a) looking for work in the reference week or (b) 
prevented from seeking work by temporary sickness or holiday or (c) waiting to start 
a job or (d) waiting for the results of a job application.  ILO unemployed are those 
without a job who are available to start work in two weeks and (a) have looked for 
work in the previous four weeks or (b) are waiting to start a job. 
(iv)  The GHS uses the LF definition up to 1996, the ILO definition in 98, 2000.  The LFS 
series uses the LF definition.  The LFS (ILO) series used the ILO definition. 32 
Table 12 
Inactivity Rates of Men (%), 1972-2002 
 
Ages  25-54  55-64 
 
  GHS  LFS  LFS (ILO)  GHS  LFS  LFS (ILO) 
 
1972-76  1.6  1.1    11.9  9.1   
1977-78  2.1  2.0    14.2  14.2   
1979-81  2.6  2.5    18.7  18.2   
1982-86  3.4  4.7    28.3  31.1   
1987-91  4.0  5.7    32.4  33.1   
1992-96  5.9  5.7  6.9  37.7  35.3  36.0 
1997-99  7.9  7.2  8.3  39.9  36.0  36.6 
2000-01  8.1  7.4  8.5  38.9  35.2  35.7 
2002    7.5  8.6    34.5  35.0 
 
Notes:  As in Table 11. 33 
Table 13 
Inactivity Rates for Men in and Outside the Bottom Skill  
Quartile (%), 1972-2002 
 
Ages  25-54  55-64 
 
  GHS  LFS  GHS  LFS 
  BSQ  NBSQ  BSQ  NBSQ  BSQ  NBSQ  BSQ  NBSQ 
 
1972-76  2.2  1.4      12.7  11.6     
1977-78  2.9  1.8      14.9  14.0     
1979-81  3.5  2.3  4.3  1.9  20.7  18.0     
1982-86  5.8  2.6  7.4  3.8  30.9  27.4  33.0  30.5 
1987-91  8.1  2.6  9.6  4.4  36.6  31.0  37.8  31.5 
1992-96  11.7  4.0  13.4  3.1  42.4  36.1  43.4  32.6 
1997-99  15.4  5.4  17.7  3.7  50.6  36.3  47.4  32.1 
2000-01  15.8  5.5  18.1  3.8  45.4  36.7  48.0  30.9 
2002      18.8  3.7      47.6  30.1 
 
Notes: 
(i)  As in Table 11. 
(ii)  BSQ (the bottom skill quartile) is based on educational qualifications.  Until the early 
1990s, those in the bottom skill quartile are a subset of those without qualifications.  
Later, those without qualifications are less than 25% of prime age men.  So the 
bottom quartile also includes some proportion of the next education group, ie. those 
with some GCSEs.  NBSQ represents those outside the bottom skill quartile. 
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Table 14 
Percentage of Men Affected by Chronic Illness 
 
Ages  25-64  25-54  55-64 
 
  LLSI  LHPD  LLSI  LHPD  LLSI  LHPD 
 
1972-76  15.0    11.2    28.1   
1979-81  18.7    14.7    32.8   
1982-86  18.2  12.7  14.0  8.7  33.2  27.1 
1987-91  19.0  14.8  14.8  10.4  35.0  31.8 
1992-96  20.0  16.5  16.2  12.2  35.5  34.3 
1997-99  20.0  17.0  16.6  13.3  33.6  36.6 
2000-01  18.9  18.5  15.0  14.6  32.9  37.3 
2002    18.1    14.1    36.3 
 
Notes: 
(i)  As in Table 11. 
(ii)  LLSI refers to a limiting long-standing illness.  This is reported in the GHS, where 
people are asked if they suffer from a long-standing illness which limits things which 
they would normally do.  LHPD refers to a limiting health problem or disability.  This 
is reported in the LFS and refers to a health problem or disability which affects the 
kind of work the person does. 
(iii)  The GHS failed to ask a consistent question of this type in 1977-78.  The LFS 
question was changed in 1997 and we have made some slight adjustment to the data 
post-1997 to correct for this. 
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Table 15 
Inactivity Rates Among Men (%) 
 
Ages  25-54  55-64 
 
  With  Without  With  Without 




10.0    0.4    32.0    4.0   
1979-
81 
11.9    0.7    39.7    8.4   
1982-
86 
15.9  28.8  1.2  1.9  53.4  66.6  16.4  18.4 
1987-
91 
19.2  28.5  1.3  1.5  59.1  65.0  18.6  16.6 
1992-
96 
26.3  36.3  1.8  1.5  66.0  68.6  23.2  17.7 
1997-
99 
33.8  43.1  2.8  1.9  64.6  72.8  29.6  18.5 
2000-
01 
34.5  41.8  3.2  2.0  70.9  70.2  25.1  18.7 
2002    43.6    2.1    70.2    18.3 
 
Notes:  See the notes to Tables 11 and 14.  LLSI is a limiting long-standing illness.  LHPD is 
a limiting health problem or disability. 
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Table 16 
The Concentration of Inactivity Among the Low Skilled and Chronically Sick: 
Age 25-54 Percentage of Male Population Who Are Inactive 
 
Year  All  Bottom Skill Quartile  Top Three Skill Quartiles 
 
    Chronically 
Sick/Disabled 




79-81  2.6  0.76  0.20  1.10  0.49 
82-86  3.4  1.05  0.42  1.30  0.60 
87-91  4.0  1.51  0.48  1.48  0.57 
92-96  5.9  2.26  0.56  2.24  0.88 
98  7.9  2.70  0.95  3.07  1.22 
00  8.1  2.88  1.00  2.65  1.60 
Change 
 
5.5  2.1  0.8  1.6  1.1 
 
           
           
Percentage of Male Population in Each Group 
 
79-81  100  4.5  20.5  10.2  64.8 
00  100  5.8  19.2    9.2  65.8 
 




Some Correlations Between Poverty Rates and Other Factors 
Based on Poverty Rates in 1993-5 in 14 Countries 
 
  Poverty Rate  Permanent Income Poverty 
(3 year average) 
Education     
Share of population (25-64) not 
completed upper secondary 
education 
 
0.26  0.38 
Work     
Unemployment rate  0.02  0.01 
Share of workless households 
 
0.42  0.56 
Benefits     
Public social expenditure (% GDP)  -0.64  -0.69 
Share of gov. transfers received by 
bottom three deciles 
 
-0.45  -0.56 
Gross replacement rates for 
unemployment benefits 
-0.82  -0.74 
 
Source:  OECD (2001), Table 2.7. 38 
Table 18 
Results from the Programme for International Student Assessment, 2000 
15-year old school children 
 
Reading Literacy  Mathematics Literacy 
  Mean   Percentiles  95/5  Mean  Percentiles  95/5 
  (SD)  5  95      5  95   
UK  523 (100)  352  682  1.94  529 (92)  374  676  1.81 
Australia  528 (102)  354  684  1.94  533 (90)  380  679  1.79 
Belgium  507 (107)  308  659  2.14  520 (106)  322  672  2.09 
Canada  534 (95)  371  681  1.84  533 (85)  390  668  1.71 
Denmark  497 (98)  326  645  1.98  514 (87)  366  649  1.77 
Finland  546 (89)  390  681  1.75  536 (80)  400  664  1.66 
Germany  484 (111)  284  650  2.29  490 (103)  311  649  2.09 
Ireland  527 (94)  360  669  1.86  503 (84)  357  630  1.76 
Norway  505 (104)  320  660  2.06  499 (92)  340  643  1.89 
NZ  529 (108)  337  693  2.06  537 (99)  364  689  1.89 
Portugal  470 (97)  300  620  2.07  454 (91)  297  596  2.01 
Sweden  516 (92)  354  658  1.86  510 (93)  347  656  1.89 
Switzerlan
d 
494 (102)  316  651  2.06  529 (100)  353  682  1.93 
US  504 (105)  320  669  2.09  493 (98)  327  652  1.99 
France  505 (92)  344  645  1.88  517 (89)  364  656  1.80 
Italy  487 (91)  331  627  1.89  457 (90)  301  600  1.99 
Spain  493 (85)  344  620  1.80  476 (91)  323  621  1.92 
OECD  500 (100)  324  652  2.01  500 (100)  326  655  2.01 
 
Source:  OECD (2001a), Tables, 2, 3a, 3.1. 39 
Table 19 
Public Expenditure on Education in the UK (% of GDP) 
 
  Public  Total 
1975-9  6.02  6.42 
1980-4  5.40  5.90 
1985-9  4.88  5.36 
1990-4  5.02  5.72 
1995-9  4.90  5.94 
2000-3  5.03   
 
Source:   Glennerster (2002), Table 1.  1998-2000 were the years with the lowest public 
expenditure in the last quarter of the 20
th Century (4.5% of GDP). 40 
Table 20 
Scores of Schools 1995-2000, Maintained Schools 
Key Stage 2:  11 years, Level 4+ 
 
    Per cent Reaching Expected Levels 
    1995  1997  1999  2000 
Maths           
  75
th percentile  63  78  83  85 




31  50  59  60 
English           
  75
th percentile   65  78  84  88 
         median  50  67  73  78 
  25
th percentile  35  52  61  64 
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